microtechnologies of power. One might also learn something about the production of social space, the spatialization of power, and the ways in which the unfolding of livesöor what it is like to be in the worldödepend upon the authoritative interpretation of space and the micromoves that constitute these interpretations.
In this paper I will sketch out some of what is commonly meant by two different but related senses of displacement: material^experiential displacement and discursive or representational displacement. I will also introduce and discuss a heuristic neologismöthe nomosphereöthat may be useful for understanding the practical connections between these different senses of the term and among legal interpretive practices, elements of spatiomateriality, and varieties of social experience. This discussion will be situated in the context of recent developments in legal geographic theory. Finally, I will provide a detailed illustration of these relationships with reference to a recent eviction case decided by the US Supreme Court.
Experiential displacement
Displacement is a useful concept. It gathers together and generalizes across a range of what may otherwise be dissimilar events and experiences, highlighting shared elements. In an age that commonly celebrates hypermobility as the embodied emblem of freedom, displacement focuses on mobility as coerced, as against the will or wishes of subjects. Displacement can be seen as a mode of desubjectification insofar as the bodies of the displaced are seen as objects operated on by outside hostile forces. It is this objectification that the evictors both facilitate and repress by blaming the victims. Displacement is about people being pushed around, expelled, removed, let go, given the bum's rush, kicked out.
The vocabulary of displacement directs our attention to these kinds of occurrences and the absences that are thereby produced. Those who are displaced continue to exist in the interstices of social space. The interstitial nation of refugees is more populous than Canada, and the interstitial city of the evicted, the homeless, and the perpetually migratory in North America is larger than the population of Vancouver. The denizens of these dispersed, pulverized geographies are both invisible and too visible. If not silent, they are largely unheard. As much as, or more so than, the more commonly cartographized spaces of sovereignty and municipal authority, the life paths and lived spaces of the displacedöthe camps and shelters, streets and fieldsöilluminate the workings of power in the world. Displacement may focus on an inaugural or threshold event such as the moment of eviction, deportation, expulsion, or arrest, but it is less a singular event than an ongoing state of being. One may be in this state for weeks or years or even generations. Raymond, a homeless man in Philadelphia writes,``The main fact of being homeless is being displaced. I'm a displaced person. I don't really live here, in this shelter. Thisöhow do you say, this level of existence is not my habitat. It's a non-existence. I don't really live anywhere' ' (quoted in VanderStaay, 1992, page 70) . Moreover, displacement is not simply a state of mind or disembodied being, it is a material condition on corporeal experience. As Samira Kawash has put it,``The condition of placelessness is marked on, or more accurately as the homeless body itself. Placelessness is the non-existence of the homeless body öhaving no place to be and having no place to be '', (1998, page 329, emphases in original) .
Displacement as a critical descriptor of events, then, seems to imply a particular understanding of place and of the relationship between place and being. Phenomenologists and cultural geographers have developed an understanding of this relation, which Edward Casey (1993) refers to as`emplacement'. In``Finding place: spatiality, locality and subjectivity'', for example, philosopher Jeff Malpas claims that,``understanding the structure and possibility of experience ... is inseparable from an understanding and appreciation of place '' (1998, page 34) . Place, he says,``is integral to the very structure and possibility of experience'' (page 33, emphases in original). It is``part of the structure of human being'' (page 35). Malpas argues further that,`I f we take the turn to place seriously, then what emerges is the possibility of thinking of subjectivity öand of thought and experienceöas essentially a function of place or locale ... . Understanding the possibility of human being öor meaningöis just a matter of understanding how place as such is possible. Understanding human being and understanding place are one and the same'' (page 36). This may be most clearly the case in the connection with the sometimes ambivalent place called`home' and with the experience of homelessness (Wright, 1997) . Patricia Anne Murphy writes in``The rights of the homeless: an examination of the phenomenology of place'' (1999) that``As a figure is partially defined by a ground, a thing or person is, in part, integrally bound to a situation. Place as particularization of space presents one dimension of the human situation. The homeless are lacking this important dimension of their situation'' (page 58).``It is no wonder then'', she continues,`t hat to be without a place is to be, at least experientially, diminished in personhood'' (page 60). Or, as Kawash (1998) says,``The resultant contradiction between a material body that most certainly occupies space and the denial of any place for such a body cannot be resolved ... . Without a proper place, the homeless body is obliged to become small, to minimize its surface and extension'' (page 330). These are powerful ways of understanding both place and the ruptures effected by displacement. And, as the title of Murphy's piece suggests, they have everything to do with law. Often the immediate agency of displacement is brute force: people flee before tanks or retreat when confronted by men with guns. But often the displacement is effected through the force of reason: the careful parsing of propositions, the considered exegesis of housing law, immigration law, or the canons of statutory interpretation, the sensitive weighing of point and counterpoint, the submission before grammatical imperatives, which can result, no less than the application of steel-toed boots to a door, in the scattering of people. It is also possible, of course, that the force of reason and the practical work of interpretation can deflect power and prevent or alleviate displacements. I will return to this point below.
Beyond law and geography
The homeless, the refugees, the deportable aliens, the indefinitely detained asylum seekers, the removed indigenous peoples, and the vagrants, like the rest of us, inhabit a material world that is drenched with the signifiers of sovereignty and property, nationhood, and ownership, and all of the supporting and subsidiary concepts and images that make our hyperterritorialized lifeworlds meaningful in terms of power. Every centimeter of the material world means. Much of this meaning is specifically legal meaning consisting of the particular and peculiar semantics associated with liberal legal discourse that constitute what have been called legal geographies.
The critical exploration of the relationship between law and geography has been a going concern for some time now. This exploration has consisted, in part, of a theoretical-cum-methodological conversation between two disciplines that conventionally had not had much to say to each other. Initially this project involved the work of translating and bridge-building. But this interdisciplinarity has always been in the service of the more important task of understanding the world. Disciplinary boundaries and the sometime parochial concerns of disciplines were recognized as impediments to understanding more clearly the social worlds of practice and experience. In these worldsöthe worlds in which lives are livedö`the legal' and`the geographical' are no more encountered separately than are`the political' and`the economic',`the social' and `the sexual', or any of the other analytical chunks into which scholars are prone to break up reality. Gordon Clark's seminal work in legal geography in the 1980s flowed from the insight that the slogan of radical geography about the mutual constitutivity of society and space and the slogan of critical legal studies about the mutual constitutivity of law and society bore more than a formal resemblance, and, indeed, that they had more substantive significance for each other (Clark, 1989; 1990) . During and since the 1990s an increasing amount of attention has been given to tracing out the theoretical and practical implications of these insights. This has resulted in the publication of monographs (Blomley, 1994; 2004; Cooper, 1998 , Darien-Smith, 1999 Delaney, 1998) , special issues of journals (Forest, 2000; Stanford Law Review 1996) , colloquia (Holder and Harrison, 2003; Sarat et al, 2003) , an anthology (Blomley et al, 2001) , as well as dissertations and numerous articles. It is fair to say that the project of critical legal geography has stimulated a good deal of exciting scholarship. Given what I have elsewhere referred to as`the twin imperialisms' of law and geographyöthe fact that very little of social life is a priori`beyond' the purview of the respective disciplines (Delaney, 2003a) öthe area of disciplinary overlap open to critical exploration is seemingly inexhaustible. Interest in critical legal geography has also expanded beyond the bidisciplinary framework encoded in the term, to become a more mutidisciplinary focus of interest as the specific insights generated by study of what Nick Blomley once called``the law and geography nexus' ' (1989) has proven useful to sociologists, anthropologists, historians, and others (Blomley et al, 2001) .
Although much more work of translating, relating, and bridge-building, not to mention applying and refining, remains to be done, Blomley has recently argued that the time has come for critical legal geographers to``move beyond the law/space binary' ' (2003, page 17) . Now, he writes,``the challenge is to find a conceptual language that allows us to think beyond binary categories such as`space' and`law' '' (page 30). His contribution is in positing the spatiolegal conjunction in terms of`splices' and`splicing'. Splices are elements of representation that encode both legal and spatial meanings. Splicing (and resplicing) refers to the practical enactment of splices (and countersplices). His illustration concerns the facilitation of public and official indifference regarding a series of murders of women sex workers in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside. These women, he suggests, were prefigured as both`legal outlaws' and`spatial outlaws'. Moreover, the combined effect of these discursive positionings was mutually reenforcing. His point is that by the workings of dominant conceptions of law^space human beings may be spliced so as to render their suffering to be of little concern. One can readily imagine other similar situations such as the indifference towards the hundreds of people who die trying to enter the United States across its southern boundary, the experience of denizens of refugee camps, native reserves, and prisons.`O ne of the important qualities of splices'', he argues,``is that they can appear inert and pregiven'' (page 30). That is, the women simply are`prostitutes' and the neighborhood simply is`a high crime area'. The same process is at work with`the homeless', the refugee', and other figures of displacement. But splices are the products of the social activity of`splicing'. And``a splice is dependent on all sorts of ongoing enactments, through technologies, discourses and practices'' (page 31). Splicing is particularly significant in the construction and revision öthat is, the politicsöof property and property relations.
Blomley asks us to imagine``ways in which dominant splicings unravel or become respliced'' (page 32).``[T]he very requirement that space [and law and space^law] be enacted and produced by those within it creates the possibility for slippage and creative reworking'' (page 32). The neologism of splicing is, I think, quite productive. One can readily reinterpret earlier work in legal geography as having been centrally concerned with the politics and pragmatics of this practice. As a heuristic with which to comprehend the inextricable conjunction of the legal and spatial, the ideas of splices and splicing, in Blomley's illustration, are more clearly articulated with respect to discourse and representational practices. Less clearly spelled out, though implied, are the ways in which these (spatiolegal) representations are imbricated with elements of the (spatiolegal) material world. I would like to suggest a complementary approach to Blomley's challenge that may begin to address this issue.
Imagining the nomosphere Earth scientists describe the planet in terms of interactions among the lithosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere, and atmosphere. These are interacting components of the physical world as understood globally (hence the suffix`-sphere') but are describable and explicable in smaller components such as biomes, strata, air masses, or watersheds. Likewise, humanists might describe our lifeworlds in terms of the semeosphere (from the root seme or meaning, as in semantics, semiology, and polysemy). The suggested utility of this term is that it draws attention to the indissolvable fusion of meaning and matter effected by spatializations. And not only are segments of lived-in landscapes saturated with meaningsönot only does space signifyöbut these semic particles can rub off on our bodies and render us legible as citizen, alien, tenant, trespasser, owner, refugee, guest, or bum. In Blomley's terms these figures are the effect of spatiolegal splicing. Their existence as figures depends on mutually constitutive readings of the spatial and the legal. If it makes sense to contemplate the semeosphere generally, then, in those contexts in which the meanings of space power and body power are themselves redeemable in the idioms and images of legal discourse perhaps it makes sense for scholars interested in critical legal geographies to talk about the nomosphere. This neologism (from the root nomos or law) refers, as a first approximation, to the cultural^material environs that are constituted by the reciprocal materialization of the legal and the legal signification of the sociospatial.
The nomosphere is a way of thinking about the complex, shifting, and always interpretable blendings of words and worlds, in which our lives are always embedded and unfolding. The idea of a nomosphere may be particularly apt to the extent that space (or place) and rights are understood in terms of each other, or to the extent that rights are understood as the gossamer filaments that connect our embodied lives to specific fragments of the worldöto places, especially to`home' and to`homeland'. The nomosphere, conceived of either as a singularity or with respect to its more specific or localized components (this apartment, that street corner, this detention center, that wilderness area), is irreducibly discursive and material. Indeed, it exists in the ever-shifting interplay between legal signifiers and material locations as these are mediated by sociospatial forms, especially territories. Among the more significant of these in the modern and thoroughly juridified world are the spatialities of public and private, property (land tenure, privacy, etc), sovereignty governance (nation-states, colonies, empires, municipalities, etc) and their complex interpenetrations. The nomosphere can be analytically sliced horizontally or vertically. Horizontally, the focus may be on the meaning and practical significance of borders, property lines, thresholds, or gates. Vertically, the focus of attention is on scale insofar as a given location in physical space (for example, where you are seated reading this) can be situated within and with respect to an open-ended cluster of overlapping legal spaces that confer meanings onö and channel power throughöthat location. Arguments about this may concern how the meanings encoded in one space affect or are affected by the meanings encoded in others. Engagements with the nomosphere in this way can be understood in terms of the politics of scale (Howitt, 2003) . And again, per Blomley, this`situating' is not a pregiven fact but the effect of splicing or, perhaps, of countersplicing. That is to say, it is the effect of (the politics) of interpretation.
As this suggests, the nomosphere is radically heterogeneous. How it is manifest in, say, rural Sumatra is vastly different than how it is manifest in midtown Manhattan. Moreover, different people occupy strikingly differing places within it. Again, consider such nomospheric figures as the illegal alien and the citizen, the owner and the squatter, the master and the slave. And each of us as living beings are multiply figured, multiply spliced. As I will discuss below, different social actors having vastly differing socially conferred capacities to operate interpretively on the nomosphere. Here, consider the border crosser and the border guard, the tenant and the landlord, the prisoner and the warden, or, as I will detail below, the low-income resident of public housing and the Supreme Court Justice. These actors have different access to the power to confer or inscribe the legal meanings onto places or lifeworlds. Indeed, this is often simply what it means to have power.
Exploration of the nomosphere involves examining the social mechanisms involved in the circulation of legal meanings through spatial forms. Among the fundamental conditions of this circulation are, first, the fact that the meanings are interpretable (and so, contestable and reviseable). Explicating this more fully requires a theory of interpretation. Second, there is in our thoroughly juridified, modern world the existence of specialized institutions and practices which by convention and coercion determine what counts as the authorized interpretation. Explicating this more fully requires a theory of law and the state. Third, there is the fact that human social agency is both highly constrained and open to novel transformations. Explicating this more fully requires a social theory. The notion of the nomosphere is responsive to Blomley's challenge``to find a conceptual language that allows us to think beyond [the] binary categories'' of space and law (2003, page 30) . Although it is compatible with his notion of splicing it differs insofar as it aims to capture a more extensive and pervasive aspect of social existence. It refers as much to our material lifeworlds as to the practices (discursive and other) through which these worlds are imagined, constituted, and transformed. It occupies us as much as we occupy it.
The nomosphere, then, names a fundamental condition of modern social being. It is as complex in its way as is the biosphere. The utility of these ideas is that they provide a vocabulary with which the legal and the spatial are grasped in their relations of mutual constitutivityöin the register of discourse, in elements of the material world, and in the interrelation of the discursive and material aspects of sociality as manifest in practice and experience. Speaking generally, the situation of the displaced is that of subjects whose experiential meanings of place are antagonistic to or denied by the authoritative interpretations of the nomosphere that are anchored in the liberal dualities of sovereignty and property, public and private. In this respect the distinctions and relations that I am tracing are analogous to Henri Lefebvre's notions of representational spaces and spaces of representation (1991) . The disjunctures between embodied, experiential meanings of displacement and the formal, categorical legal meanings of space and place may effect a very differentöbut intimately relatedösort of displacement.
Discursive displacement
Like the social category of the displaced, the metaphor of`displacement' is a very useful resource in the analysis and critique of discursive practices and speech acts. It is particularly useful for understanding the workings of the nomosphere. As I will describe in detail in subsequent sections, discursive (or representational) displacementsöunderstood as tactical operations on (and from within) the nomosphereöare significant in efforts to effect (justify, criticize, enforce, resist) experiential displacements such as evictions, deportations, or incarcerations. Displacement is used prolifically in critical assessments of power and, more specifically, of law. It is a way of talking about what is said, and, more precisely, about which is unsaid and how it is unsaid. It names a kind of silence and silencing. But the metaphor does different kinds of work in different contexts. In its most basic use it refers to a substitution or to the erasure of some representational element and its replacement by another. Legal scholars may talk of the displacement of rights or norms or of the law itself by, for example, social science (see, for example, Goodrich, 1998) . As with the material^experiential displacements that serve as the source concept for the metaphor, use of metaphorical displacement foregrounds what has been removed, excluded, expelled, left out, or banished from a given representation of a state of affairs. It highlights the usually illicit and tacit process of exclusion. By way of emphasizing this the displacement metaphor is often accompanied by metaphors or masking, disguising, or distorting. These companion metaphors give some suggestion as to where the excluded elements have gone and further suggest that through the work of criticism they may be recoverable or retrievable.
Often the displacement metaphor is used in association with other critical notions such as repression, denial, or disavowal. In an essay concerning enforcement of Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, Elizabeth Chambliss writes that its`e nforcement strategy and ... enforcement system ... were based from the outset on the denial of ... fundamental regulatory conflict. I show how this denial is obscured, through repeated structural displacements of conflict, each of which promises the resolution of conflict elsewhere. Basically, my argument is that Title VII is a shell game; that it palms the conflict it purports to address, and disguises the palm through the mechanism of displacement' ' (1997, page 4) . In this sense displacement may shade into a`term of art' in Freudian discourse that signifies a defense mechanism against the recognition of a deeper reality.``Displacement is a defence against anxietyöa signal from within the ego, when threatened with frustration or loss of the desired object or of being overwhelmed by a drive'' (WalrondSkinner, 1986, page 101, emphasis in original). Displacement is also a term of art in deconstructive criticism. According to one commentator,```displacement' has become an indispensable term in the new post-structuralist theory'' (Krupnick, 1983, page 1) . In this context it may signify an operation in which two terms of a binary oppositioǹ`e xchange properties and trade places in a hierarchical ladder'' (Roithmayr, 1997 (Roithmayr, , page 1468 . It is important to note that when used in this sense displacement may be a good thing as critics seek to`displace' the social hierarchies that the binaries naturalize and sustain. There is, then, an array of related but distinguishable uses to which the metaphor`displacement' may be put in critical social thought. The two kinds of displacement under examination hereöembodied-experiential and discursive or representationalöare interrelated in the nomosphere. This interrelatedness is primarily a matter of socially and historically situated practice, and sketching some of this out is my principal objective. First, though, I briefly discuss some of the practical aspects of engaging and operating on the nomosphere.
Nomospheric practice
There are, among us, social, political actors who specialize in working to restructure interpretively parts of the nomosphere in order to prevent, remedy, or mitigate evictions, expulsions, or detentions. These are, for example, members of the immigration, fair-housing, or criminal-defense bars, poverty lawyers, lawyers who represent the displaced or dispossessed. They are practitioners and scholars whose expertise includes the spatialization of legal meanings or the legal signification or space or place. In Blomley's terms they are`resplicers': professionals and para-professionals seeking tò unravel dominant splices' by interpretively creating or exploiting`slippages' in the nomosphere. Speaking very broadly, their projects are oriented toward reconfiguring the connections between legal signs (doctrines, categories, and so on), places, and embodied experiences which constitute the nomosphere. Working as scholars they conjure up interpretive tools such as:`the right not to be displaced' (Stavropoulou, 1994) , or`the right to remain' (Morawetz, 2000) , or, more specifically,`the right to remain nowhere' (National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, 1993), out of existing available legal-normative resources such as human rights, civil rights, or due process. As practitioners working within formal institutional settings, these specialists engage in discursive operationsöinterpreting, arguing, crafting sylogisms, and narrativesöwhich, if accepted by the guardians of the nomosphere, are intended to effect the circulation of meaning and power through the material world and, therefore, the unfolding of embodied experiences in the material world. Of course, these specialists are opposed by othersöattorneys for the Immigration and Naturalization Service or landlords and the like. What we can see in these encounters are contests among these nomospheric technicians öor Lefebvrian`space doctors' (1991, page 99)öwho in various ways, small and large, interpretively restructure our lifeworlds. Among the available techniques is discursive displacement. With this in mind I will now sketch out a more detailed illustration that will return us to my opening themes.
One strike and you're out In March of 2002, by a vote of 8 to 0, the US Supreme Court authorized the eviction of elderly African-American tenants from their homes even though it was acknowledged that they had done nothing wrong (Department of Housing and Urban Development v Rucker 122 S. Ct. 1230 Ct. , 2002 . Indeed, the evictions were justified because the tenants were powerless to control people and events in places far removed from their homes. The key text with reference to which interpretive struggles unfolded is the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 which contains what has been called the`One Strike and You're Out' clause (Hornstein, 1996; Johnson, 2000; Mock, 1998) . It states,`.
.. a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or a guest or other person under the tenant's control shall not engage in criminal activity, including drug related criminal activity, on or off such premises while the tenant is a tenant in public housing, and such criminal activity shall be cause for termination of tenancy'' [42 U.S.C. 1437d(1)(5), emphasis added].
In 1991 the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued regulations giving local public housing authorities (PHAs) the power to evict a tenant whose household members or guests are involved in drug activity. The regulation stated that,`T he tenant should not be excused from contractual responsibility by arguing that the tenant did not know, could not foresee, or could not control behavior of other[s]'' (56 Federal Register 51567). PHAs throughout the United States included the One Strike and You're Out clause in their leases and, of course, tenants have no choice but to sign the leases. In 2001 HUD issued further directives which foreclosed the availability of judicial reviews of summary evictions under the act. According to HUD,`T he statute does not authorize courts to exercise ... discretion. Courts [can only] determine whether a violation of the lease has occurred and whether the lease provides that such a violation is grounds for eviction of the persons whom the PHA seeks to evict '' (66 Federal Register 28 782) . That is, under this reading of the rules courts are specifically excluded from considering any mitigating circumstances such as blamelessness, hardship, or good-faith efforts to comply.
Welcome to the nomosphere. Here is a chain of signification running from statute to regulations to leases that confers a quantum of legal meaning onto portions of social space and formally describes the potentiality of power that circulates within and beyond that space. According to the authorities, crucial elements of this chain of meanings obligate the tenant to control the space referenced in the lease. The apartment is to be drug free. There is zero tolerance. The rule applies not only to the formal tenant but to all who live in the unit, to guests, workers, or anyone else. The border is to be secure. Otherwise all who call the place home may be evicted. Moreover, and perhaps more alarmingly, the leaseholder is also obligated to control the behavior of household members even when they are not at home. Indeed, as one judge noted,`H UD has taken the position that the statute would apply and permit eviction of an entire family if a tenant's child was visiting friends on the other side of the country and was caught smoking marijuana, even if the parents had no idea the child had ever engaged in such activity and even if they had no realistic way to control their child's actions 3000 miles away'' (Rucker v Davis 237 F. 3d 1113, 2002, page 1124). One might understandably regard this as an extraordinary constitution of space power. In exchange for shelter, tenants are set up as absolute sovereigns with territorial jurisdiction over their microspace and extraterritorial, personal jurisdiction over all who formally live with them. That is, it applies to anyone who is listed as residing there whether or not they do in fact (City of South San Francisco v Guilley 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367, 1995) . At the same time the PHA's interpretation prohibits tenants from claiming innocence and prevents judges from hearing these claims. The key word coursing through the chain of signification is`control'. Failure to controlöfailure to live up to the sovereign expectations or to perform competently the role of sovereignöis grounds for removal, even if, as the regulation warns, the tenant did not know of and could not have foreseen drug-related criminal activity.
The policy has been put into effect a number of times. Thus, Vergie Green was evicted from her home in New Orleans because her baby-sitter was found selling drugs out of Vergie's apartment (Housing Authority v Green 657 So. 2d 552, 1995) . Barbara Lee, a public-housing resident for thirty years, was evicted when her nephew was busted smoking a joint in the parking lot (Rucker v Davis 203 F.3d 627, 2000) . Herman Walker, a 75-year-old disabled man, was evicted when his health-care worker was found with cocaine in his apartment (Rucker v Davis 203 F.3d 627, 2000) . And Nena Allen and her two children were evicted after one marijuana seed ötraced to her baby-sitteröwas found in her apartment (City of Marietta v Allen, cited in Amici Curiae Brief to US Supreme Court submitted by The Coalition to Protect Public Housing et al, 2000 US Briefs 1770). These examples, presumably, represent the tip of the iceberg that pokes into appellate cases.
Not surprisingly, fair-housing and antiracist activists as well as advocates for the elderly and civil libertarians have reacted with outrage. As one tenant activist was quoted as saying,``The war on drugs has become a war on grandparents. This is a racist and classist rule'' (quoted in Finz, 2000) . In response, advocates have taken the usual path to try to block the displacements. They went to work on the nomosphere by challenging HUD's and local PHAs' interpretation of the statute in federal courts, where they advanced counterinterpretations. In my more general terms they are not only interpreting texts but also necessarily interpreting the meanings of social space, the connections between space and power, and the constitutive meanings of place.
Oakland Housing Authority v Rucker
Here is a more detailed sketch of what happened in Pearlie Rucker's case. Ms Rucker was, at the time the story begins, a 63-year-old African-American woman who lived with her mentally disabled daughter, two grandchildren, and great granddaughter in a public-housing unit on East 21st Street in Oakland, California (Finz, 2000) . She had lived there for thirteen years and was a model tenant. In 1996 her daughter was arrested for drug possession elsewhere in Oakland and, as a result, the Oakland PHA evicted the entire family from their home. Lawyers for the Eviction Defense Center in Oakland sought an injunction from a federal judge. The district court judge granted the injunction and, provisionally, reinterpreted the spatiality of legal meaning and power. The tenant can legitimately be expected to control the presence of drugs on the premises, he found, but she cannot reasonably be expected to control the behavior of others off the premises. Such an expectation was clearly absurd. Therefore, the housing authority can evict for drug-related activity inside but not outside the space of the apartment. The Oakland PHA appealed and a panel of the eighth circuit court reversed the district court's decision and dissolved the injunction (Rucker v Davis  203 F.3d 627, 2000) . The tenants sought a hearing by the full court, which reaffirmed the district court's reading of space (Rucker v Davis 237 F.3d 1113 , 2001 .
During oral arguments before the US Supreme Court in February 2002, in what some might see as an enactment of displaced aggression, Ms Rucker's attorney was bullied and ridiculed by the justices, while the attorneys for HUD and the housing authority were treated solicitously, the justices effectively making their arguments for them (see oral arguments at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts.html 00-1770 00- , 19 February 2002 . Three weeks later the Supreme Court unanimously validated the HUD^PHA reading of space power in public-housing land (HUD v Rucker 122 S. Ct.1230 Ct. , 2002 . Tenants are obligated to control the behavior of others on and off the premises. If, for any reason, they prove incapable of doing so, they and their families may be evicted.
Working on the nomosphere
What I want to focus on are some of the interpretive strategies employed by tenant advocates and the response to these by the authorities. The advocates' objective was to restructure legal space interpretively in order to effect, direct, or deflect experiential displacements. Given the institutional and conventional constraints of the nomosphere this was to be accomplished by translating (displacing) struggles over material^exper-iential displacements into interpretive struggles about meaning (semantics, syntax, and pragmatics; categorical boundaries, syllogisms, etc). This tactical, practical displacement, if successful, would then be traced back into the lifeworlds of experience (place) through the instrumentality of the court's orders.
Advocates for the tenants made a number of independent arguments as to why HUD and the PHAs had exceeded their authority and illegallyöand unjustlyöevicted tenants. One principal argument was that the statuteöthe Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988öwas, in significant respects, ambiguous. As one of the circuit court judges put it, the act``is not a picture of clarity and may be subject to various interpretations '' (Rucker v Davis 237 F.3d at 1123 , 2001 . Because the act was ambiguous and subject to conflicting interpretations, advocates could claim that the HUD regulations were inconsistent with the statute and, therefore, invalid. The inconsistencies included HUD's construal of`control', the prohibition on raising an`innocent tenant' defense, and the foreclosure of judicial review. What the advocates were attempting to do was to read ambiguity into the nomosphere as it effects the space of public housing sufficiently enough to create room for interpretation, in order to open up the possibility of blocking evictions. In some earlier cases advocates had been successful (Syracuse Housing Authority v Boule 658 N.T.S. 2d 776, 1996) . In the Rucker litigation, as we saw, the district court accepted this reading, whereas a panel of the circuit court rejected it.
Subsequently a majority of the full court accepted it and, ultimately, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected it. The Rucker family was spliced and respliced over and over again.
Against the claim that the statute was ambiguousöand against the possible inference allowing the tracing of this ambiguity through the chain of signification that connected the statute to the leases and the spaces that they make meaningfulöChief Justice Rehnquist claimed that the statute``unambiguously requires lease terms that vest PHAs with discretion to evict tenants ... whether or not the tenants know, or should have known, about the activit[ies]'' of other household members (HUD v Rucker 122 S.Ct. 1230 at 1233 , 2002 .``That this is so'', he wrote,``seems evident from the plain language of the statute'' (page 1233). Therefore,``Court of Appeals finding of textual ambiguity is wrong'' (page 1234). More specifically addressing the advocates' construal of`control', he continued,``their interpretation runs counter to basic rules of grammar'', where HUD's interpretation of control is governed by a``grammatical imperative'' (page 1234).
Tracing displacements
So how might what was happening to Pearlie Rucker and her family (their experiential displacement) be illuminated by attending to the workings of discursive displacement? First, and perhaps most obviously, translating the experiential events into the categories of legal discourse, according to some, effects a per se displacement. In his Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse (1998), William Conklin employs the metaphor of displacement to describe``how juridical agents ... transform and conceal the embodied meanings of someone who has been harmed'' (page 21); how displacement``excludes the particular experiences of [someone like Pearlie Rucker] by offering signs to represent [her] as a cognitive object'' (page 22); how, more specifically, displacement``conceals suffering'' (page 53); and how, as a result of such representational displacement,``the person harmed ... becomes an outsider to legal discourse'' (page 57). From this perspective, Pearlie Rucker, as rendered in the institutional idioms of legal discourse, is less a human subjectöand much less a mother and grandmotheröthan she is a figure in a system of signs. The figure`tenant' is made manifest in the world of signs by her signature on the standardized lease that binds her through a chain of signifiers to a cluster of administrative regulations and inferred congressional intentions. In Conklin's view, though, her advocates participate in such displacements as much as the authorities do. They have no choice. But we might imagine that they engaged in tactical discursive displacements in order to prevent the material^experiential displacements associated with eviction, where the authorities did so in order to facilitate and legitimate the production of homelessness.
Second, if some displacements are relatively more or less`displacive' than others then they might be assessed along the lines of relative repression, denial, or distortion. Thus advocates stressed the good-faith efforts of tenants, the absurdity of expecting that people can control the actions of others unconstrained by space and time, and the real consequences of low-income families being evicted from subsidized housing. Authorities, in contrast, left out, excluded, and denied the experiential realities of life in public housing, of the practicalities of multigenerational households headed by grandmothers, and, in this case, of Rucker's actual efforts to abide by the law of the land. Drawing on conceptions of place and personhood that I sketched above, one might say that the authorities also repressed or denied the experiential meanings of place, emplacement, and home, and, likewise, of homelessness, rupture, and loss. That is, much of what was displacedöin the sense of repressed, denied, and distorted öin the authority's account was the embodied experience of displacement itself.
Third, we might also recognize displacement as an inversion, or as a discursive operation, in which two terms of a binary opposition``exchange properties and trade places in a hierarchical ladder'' (Roithmayr, 1997 (Roithmayr, , page 1468 . Recall that residents of public housing had been effectively deputized by all three branches of the federal government. Signing a lease conferred onto parents, grandparents, aunts, and uncles the attributes of sovereign authority with both territorial and extraterritorial dimensions. Pearlie Rucker, Vergie Green, Barbara Lee, Herman Walker, and millions of others were positioned as the central loci of power. They were to`control' the behavior of others within and beyond the space of their apartments. They could not simply kick offending children out of the apartment, because drug use off premises is no less an offense than is drug use in the living room. They had to expunge their names from the forms. As the authorities continually assert, control means control. It is unqualified. It is governed by`grammatical imperatives'. Rucker's adjudged incompetence as a sovereign both enabled their denial of her innocence and provided the foundation for the powerlessness of judges to intervene. In an important sense, the state and Pearlie Rucker temporarily traded places along the axes of power and innocence. As in the example of the White men whose confessional eviction narratives began this paper, such displacements of responsibility effect the discursive disavowal of power.
There is one last sense of displacement that I want to touch on. The strategy of the advocates, as I suggested, was to read ambiguity into the law, into the controlling system of signs and chains of signification, and, therefore, into the social spaces and lifeworlds made meaningful by these signsöthat is, into the nomosphere as it was constructed in this corner of Oakland, California. Within the conventional constraints of the practice, they insisted on the interpretability of the world. They did so in order to create, as we say, room to maneuver, in order to create a space from which Pearlie Rucker and similarly situated low-income tenants might tell their stories and within which judges might respond. The authorities sought to deny ambiguity, polysemy, and interpretability precisely to foreclose these potentially dialogic spaces öand they succeeded.
But, for a time, between the filing for the initial injunction and the issuing of the Supreme Court's decision, both readings of space, meaning, and power öthat is, contending readings of the nomosphereöcoexisted as potentialities. Social space as ambiguous, interpretable, and open and social space as clear, certain, obvious, and closed jostled for supremacy in Ms Rucker's apartment in Oakland and throughout public-housing land. As rival readings (splicings) were validated and invalidated in succession, the spaces oscillated: opening and closing, opening and closing. But, in the end, only one set of meanings could remain. Ultimately, the advocates' interpretation of the world as interpretable was displacedödislodgedöfrom the apartment by the authority's interpretation of the world as not interpretable, a world governed by grammatical imperatives. And on this basis the life paths of the Ruckers were set in motion by the force of reason.
Conclusion
Each of these representational displacements names a practical discursive operation. They are ways of saying and not saying, ways of making sense of power and experience and meanings and the segmented spaces and places of the sociomaterial world. They are practical interventions and perturbations in the nomosphere connecting chains of signification to places, and disconnecting lives from places by discursively operating on the rights and duties that are understood as binding us to our lifeworlds.
We all inhabit the nomosphere. There is no outside. Likewise, it inhabits us. There is no outside. As Robert Gordon wrote a generation ago,``law is omnipresent in the very marrow of society'' (1984, page 109). In the subsequent years sociolegal scholars have followed the tracings of the legal through diverse consciousnesses, through the various technologies and techniques of embodiment and disembodiment, and through the materialities of life (Delaney, 2003b) . We can now see how the legal is legible in the plastic trash bags stuffed with tenants' possessions and put out by the curb by eviction crews, in the changed locks on the door, in the guns that signify the`or else' that conditions compliance, and in the homeless bodies propelled by force of reason to curl into tight little balls against the weight of grammatical imperatives.
At the same time, geographers (and others) have engaged in a sustained attack on the inherited dualism of`society' and`space' such that we now see (and think, and act in) the world differently than we did before the critical turn. Building on Marxist, humanistic, feminist, and poststructuralist geographical inquiry, critical legal geography has been a small but productive component of this movement. If lawöand legal phenomena more generallyöis not`other than' the social, neither is it other than the sociospatial. Blomley's challenge is to think our way beyond the gap. Like his heuristic neologisms (splices, splicing, resplicing) my suggestions concerning the nomosphere are worth considering only to the extent that they help us to get over that gap and begin our explorations from the point of view that recognizes not only the inextricablỳ entangled' (Blomley, 2003, page 29) relation of the (analytically) legal and spatial but also the dynamically fused nature of the discursive and material as these play out in and condition social practice and experience.
Just as each of us occupies a different location within the nomosphere with respect to the sociolegal spatialities of sovereignty and property, nationhood and ownership, public and private, so we are differentially positioned with respect to the discursive practices through which our lifeworlds are invested with legal meanings. Just as we are differently and multiply spliced, so we have often radically divergent access to the practice of splicing. In either case what is at issue here is how power circulates (is exercised, justified, criticized, and experienced) through spaces and places and lives. We might want to imagine a world in which displacements are less frequent or less casual. On the one hand this might be a world in which more people haveösubstan-tively, not merely formallyö`the right to remain'. On the other hand, though, it might be a world in which the authoritiesöthe guardians of the nomosphere, the space doctorsödo not feel compelled to deny, disguise, or disavow their contempt for the powerless.
